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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CAROLE LEE DeWEGELI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

No. 860126

HARRISON G. DeWEGELI,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS
Plaintiff
verified

sought

complaint

in

a

divorce

the

lower

from

defendant

court

(R.

by

1-3).

filing

a

Defendant

answered and counterclaimed alleging, among other things, that
the parties owned a home and that he should receive one-half of
the equity in the home (R. 8 ) .
The parties, prior to separation, both resided in the home
located at 3301 Mohican, Provo, Utah.

In March, 1984, the home

was in danger of foreclosure and the parties owed numerous debts
to their personal and business creditors.

The financial picture

of the parties was such that they were not credit-worthy and were
not in a position to borrow money to pay their debts and save the
home (R. 110-111) .
Through and including March, 1984, the parties owned and
operated,

an

art

gallery

business.

(R.

109).

The parties1

business and tax obligations existing in March, 1984, related in
part to said art gallery business (R. 110).
Defendant deeded his interest in the home and real property
in question to plaintiff's parents so that plaintiff and her

parents

could

obtain

a loan against

the property

to pay the

parties1 personal and business debts (R. Ill, 170). Exhibit No. 1
is the deed whereby defendant conveyed away his interest in the
property.

Said exhibit was introduced and received by the lower

court (R. 27, 34), having previously been recorded in the office
of the Utah County Recorder under Entry No. 87 4 4 at Book 2124 and
Page 151, on March 26, 1984, as shown on the face of the exhibit.
In return for defendant deeding away his interest

in the

property, plaintiff agreed to borrow against the home and to use
the loan proceeds to pay defendant's share of the family debts
and obligations (R. 113, 170).
At the time of the giving of the deed to the home by defendant,

the

parties

were

separating

and

contemplating

divorce

and the deeding of the home was part of a property settlement
made in anticipation of divorce (R. 113).
Plaintiff

and

her

the debts in question.

parents

borrowed

the

funds

and

(Exhibits 3 and 4, R. 170, 179).

paid
Since

the date of the deed, plaintiff has held defendant harmless from
the business debts and obligations as agreed (R. 113, 114, 115,
116) .
Since the date of the deed from defendant, plaintiff has
made substantial expenditures to repair damages to the home which
predated the giving of the deed, and plaintiff has made all of the
2

monthly payments on the obligations secured by the home (R. Ill,
114) .
The home in question was purchased by the parties with a
purchase money

loan

and

a substantial

down

proceeds of a sale of the parties' prior home.

payment

from

the

(R. 167-168).

Defendant alleged, in his testimony, that there was a verbal
understanding that at some unspecified time after some unspecified
conditions, the ownership of the home would be deeded back to the
plaintiff and defendant jointly (R. 169-170).
identify what,

if anything, he had done to entitle him to a

return of the property.

(R 169-171).

Defendant admitted
deed

was

not

Defendant did not

the

in his testimony that his signing the

result

influence. (R. 177)

of

any

coercion,

duress

or

undue

He further stated he had no conversation or

understanding with plaintiff's parents prior to signing the deed.
(R. 180 - 181)
From the time of the execution of the deed by defendant, he
abandoned the home and did not reside there. (R. 178 - 179)
Plaintiff's parents later deeded the property to plaintiff,
as

the

only

ownership

of

grantee
the

of

the

property

deed

(Exhibit

conveying
2).

away

their

Plaintiff's

legal

parents

continue to claim an equitable interest in the property and hold a

3

trust deed on the property securing a promissory note given to
them by plaintiff.

(Exhibits 5 and 6)

Plaintiff's mother stated in her testimony that her ownership
interest in the property was strictly for security purposes and
that she had no discussion with defendant and plaintiff as to a
reconveyance of the property to them jointly, although she would
have done so if it had been requested by the parties and if she
had been repaid.
Defendant
harmless

from

(R. 157 - 159)
did

not

dispute

and

had

paid

the

that

plaintiff

marital

debts

had
in

held

him

question.

Defendant did not claim or ever allege that he had paid or repaid
any portion of said debts or the loss taken by plaintiff and her
parents to pay said debts and obligations.

(R. 170)

The trial court made the following finding of fact relative
to the parties1 interest in the home:
8.
The
deed
from
plaintiff
and
defendant
to
plaintiff's parents was intended as a security interest
for obligations owing to plaintiff's parents. The deed
from plaintiff's parents to plaintiff conveying the
home located at 3301 Mohican, Provo, Utah County, Utah,
did not alter defendant's interest in the home and the
home of the parties is found to be a marital asset,
subject to all existing liens and encumbrances. (R. 65)
Based upon the above finding, the trial court entered the
following order in the Decree of Divorce:
5.
The
deed
from
plaintiff
and
defendant
to
plaintiff's parents was intended as a security interest
for obligations owing to plaintiff's parents. The deed
-4

from plaintiff's parents to plaintiff conveying the
home located at 3301 Mohican Lane, Provo, Utah County,
Utah, did not alter defendant's interest in the home and
the home of the parties is a marital asset, subject to
all existing liens and encumbrances.
Plaintiff's
parents would have given a deed to defendant had he so
requested.
The conveyance to only the plaintiff,
therefore, was not intended to terminate defendant's
interest in the property. (R. 70)
7.
Plaintiff is awarded the home located at 3301
Mohican Lane, Provo, Utah, until she remarries, the
youngest child reaches 18 years of age, plaintiff
vacates the home or plaintiff sells the home, whichever
occurs first.
At the time of such event (unless
previously sold), the home is to be sold and the equity
in the home should be divided equally between the
parties after deducting all costs of sale. The equity
is to be determined based upon the value of the home as
of May, 1984, or the time of sale, whichever is the
lesser amount. (R. 71)
The above cited findings and orders of the trial court focus
only upon the issue concerning the deeds as they pertained to
plaintiff's parents and do not specifically address the deed as
it affects plaintiff, despite a request that such a finding and
order be included.

(R. 42)

It is. from the award of a portion of any equity in the home
to defendant that plaintiff now appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-2-3, 1953, as amended, makes
interspousal

transfers valid

between other persons.

to the

same

extent

as

transfers

A deed of conveyance from one spouse to

another which is supported by consideration and which is duly
5

executed, acknowledged, delivered and recorded is not subject to
being set aside absent clear and convincing evidence establishing
a basis for cancelling the deed, i.e., fraud, constructive trust,
etc.
Plaintiff gave valid consideration for the deed of conveyance
from defendant by paying certain debts and obligations of the
defendant and holding him harmless therefrom.

Defendant cannot

now employ general equitable principles to reclaim his property
interest which was freely and voluntarily contracted away.
This is not a case where the property in question was placed
in the name of only one spouse by mistake, inadvertence, a desire
to avoid taxes or some similar reason.

This case involves a

conscious transfer for consideration at a time when the parties
were separating and contemplating divorce.
The

evidence

presented

by

defendant

did

not

clearly

or

convincingly establish a basis for setting aside the deed and
clearly preponderates in favor of plaintiff's position relative
to the validity of the conveyance.
questions

of

fact

and

law

and

This court should review the
enter

judgment

for

plaintiff

awarding her all right, title and interest to the property.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY
CONVEYED TO PLAINTIFF HIS INTEREST IN THE
REAL PROPERTY AND IT WAS ERROR TO AWARD
DEFENDANT AN INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY.
The undisputed facts presented to the trial court were that
defendant executed and delivered a deed of conveyance purporting
to convey all right, title and interest he may have had to the
real property in question to the plaintiff and her parents.

The

undisputed facts further showed that good and valuable consideration passed between plaintiff and defendant in consideration for
the deed. Defendant thereafter, through his Counterclaim, claimed
an ownership interest in the real property notwithstanding the
deed.
The law in the State of Utah and the majority rule in other
jurisdictions is that a deed supported by a valid consideration
may hot be set aside except upon a showing of clear and convincing
evidence that certain specified grounds exist for setting aside
the deed.

This principle was clearly stated in the case of Gold

Oil Land Dev. Corp. v. Davis, 611 P. 2d 711 (Utah 1980).

In that

case the plaintiff sued to declare invalid a deed to certain land
in Utah County.
any

consideration

The trial court found that there had not been
given

for

the

invalid delivery of the deed.

deed

and

that

there

was an

The Supreme Court affirmed the
7

trial

court's

findings

on

appeal

and

clearly

enunciated

the

standard by which a claim to invalidate a deed must be judged:
Defendants place reliance upon the fact that
the deed in question was duly acknowledged
and recorded. With respect thereto we agree
with these propositions advocated by them:
That when a deed is duly acknowledged and
recorded, there arise the presumptions that
it was duly executed and that there was a
valid delivery thereof; and further, that
those presumptions can only be overcome by
clear and convincing evidence.
Id. at 712.
355

See also, Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P.2d

(1934) ; Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d

420, 413 P.2d 807 (1966).
Another important Utah case which addresses this issue is
Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984).

In the Baker case, the

personal representative of an estate brought an action to cancel a
warranty deed given by the deceased and to quiet title in the
property

to

the

estate.

The plaintiff

advanced

theories

of

resulting trust, invalid delivery, undue influence and failure of
consideration.

The trial court refused to invalidate the deed

under any of these theories and this Court affirmed.

In its

holding, this Court re-emphasized the standard relating to the
cancelling or setting aside of a deed as follows:
Plaintiff contends that the deed was not
delivered and accepted with the requisite
legal intent and that at best it must be
viewed to be a conveyance in trust. Where a
deed is executed with no intent to transfer a

present interest, it will be invalidated by a
court in equity.
[Citation omitted.]
This
Court has held that a conveyance is valid
only upon delivery of a deed with present
intent to transfer, Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah
2d 287, 351 P.2d 959 (1960).
A presumption
of valid delivery arises where a deed has
been executed and recorded.
Kresser v.
Peterson, Utah, 675 P.2d 1193 (1984); Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, supra,
but such a presumption may be overcome by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Gold Oil Land Dev. Corp. v. Davis, Utah, 611
P.2 711 (1980).
The recording of a deed in placing
the names of others on the property
is somewhat in the nature of a
public
declaration
that
[the
grantor] intended the instrument to
become
effective
immediately.
People as a rule do not deliberately
put a flaw in the title to their
property, thereby handicapping its
later disposal, unless they really
intend to transfer some interest to
the person whose name is thus
placed in the record.
Allen v.
Allen, 115 Utah 303, 204 P. 2d 458
(1949) .
Id. at 634, 635.
In the present

case,

Exhibit

1 clearly

established

that

defendant deeded away his interest in the property to plaintiff
and her parents and that said deed was duly signed, acknowledged
and recorded in the Office of the Utah County Recorder.

In an

effort to overcome the deed and reclaim an ownership interest in
the

property,

defendant

presented

the

following

support his claimed interest in the property:
9

testimony

to

Q

Was there a proposal made to you about conveying

the property to her parents?
A

Yes, there was.

Q

Will you tell me about that?

A

I was told at the time in order to

Q

Who told you?

A

It was my wife Carole.

Q

What did she say?

A

That to —

—

in order to get a second loan on the

home to pay debts that we would sign the home over to
her parents.
Q

What would they do with the home?

A

They would

—

after being

signed

to them

they

would get a loan, a second loan.
Q

What would they do with that money?

A

To pay the debts.

Q

After they got the loan what would they do with it

—

the home?

A

It was

—

I was

told

that

the

home

would

be

returned, would be signed back into my name and my
wife's name.
Q

Come back to both of you?

10

A

That was my understanding it was to come back to

me and her.
Q

Did she tell you at that time she wanted the home

to come back only to her?
A

No.

Q

If she had told you that she wanted the home only

to come back to her would you have deeded the property
to your in-laws?
A

Definitely not.

Q

Did you in fact sign the deed to your in-laws?

A

I did, yes.

Q

Did they obtain a loan?

A

Yes.

Q

Did they us the money to pay the family debts?

A

Yes.

Q

And did they deed the property back to you and

your wife?
A

No, they did not.

Q

When did you discover that?

A

I don't know the exact date, but a month or so

later they told me they were sorry I was out of town at
the time they needed to sign it back over and they just
signed it to my wife Carole.

11

(R 169-171).

There was no argument at trial that the above cited testimony
established

implied

trust,

failure

of

consideration,

fraud,

duress, undue influence or any other recognized reason to cancel
the deed.

Defendant merely relied on the equitable powers given

the trial court by Section 30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, to
reclaim his alleged interest in the property.
Plaintiff

respectfully

submits

that

defendant's

reliance

upon the equitable powers of the trial court to reclaim ownership
of

the

property

is

misplaced.

Section

30-2-3,

Utah

Code

Annotated, 1953 as amended, specifically addresses the issue of
interspousal conveyances and states as follows:
A conveyance, transfer or lien executed by
either husband or wife to or in favor of the
other shall be valid to the same extent as
between other persons.
The above cited code section must be considered and given effect
when considering the equitable powers of the trial court to make a
distribution of property under Section 30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953, as
amended.

Plaintiff respectfully

submits that pursuant

to the

above cited statutes, the deed between the parties was valid and,
while

the

Court

may

have

inherent

powers

to

make

equitable

divisions of the property, it must first determine legal ownership
and give due credit to a valid transfer between husband and wife
under U.C.A., Section 30-2-3.

See also Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah

2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954).
12

Plaintiff does not simply rely on the condition of title in
making the argument herein.

Plaintiff does not dispute that

the status of title by itself is not determinative of the property
interests of the parties in a divorce action.
specifically

This Court has

held that the status of record title to marital

property prior to a decree of divorce is not binding on the trial
court in its distribution of such property.

The trial court in a

divorce case is empowered to make equitable distributions and may
compel conveyances as necessary to achieve the equitable end.
Workman v. Workman.

652 P. 2d 931

See

(Utah 1982) and Jackson v.

Jackson, 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980).
The statutory and case law of Utah recognizes that a husband
and wife may,

for many reasons, jointly

acquire property and

place it in the name of only one of the parties.

In such a

situation the trial court would rightly consider the property to
oe jointly owned despite record title.
sxist in this case.

Such a situation did not

The title to the property herein was always

leld in the joint names of the parties and the property was
ilways a marital asset until defendant made a valid conveyance to
)laintiff of all right, title and interest which he previously
Leld in the property

in question.

Defendant's

conveyance to

daintiff is valid pursuant to U.C.A., Section 30-2-3 and may not
•e set aside under Utah law except by clear and convincing proof
13

of some wrongdoing on the part of plaintiff, i.e., fraud, duress,
failure of consideration, or other clearly established basis for
avoiding the consequences of the deed.
This court has forcefully stated that a party in a divorce
action may not avoid an interspousal agreement by entering a plea
in equity.

This statement of the Court is found in

605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980).

Land v. Land,

In that case, this Court considered a

divorce action where defendant attempted to avoid the effects of a
written agreement with his spouse giving up rights and privileges
of property of the parties.

The defendant Land asked the court

to modify the Decree of Divorce which was based upon a written
stipulation between the parties so as to do equity between the
parties.

The trial court refused to look behind the stipulation

of the parties to do "equity."

This Court affirmed the trial

court and stated as follows:
Defendant's contention that the court must
look behind his stipulation in order to do
equity is without merit. True it is that, in
making a division of property by a decree of
divorce a trial court is governed by general
principles of equity.
It is likewise true
that the court retains continuing jurisdiction
over the parties and may modify the decree
due to changes in circumstances, equitable
considerations again to govern.
It must,
however, be added that, when a decree is
based upon a property settlement or agreement,
forged by the parties and sanctioned by the
court, equity must take such agreement into
consideration.
Equity is not available to
reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily

14

contracted away simply because one has come
to regret the bargain made. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 1250-1251.
While the facts of Land v. Land, supra, involved an agreement
presented

to

and

approved

by

the

trial

court,

enunciated governs the issue in the present case.

the

principle

A party may not

use the inherent equitable powers of the Court in an effort to
reclaim property rights which were voluntarily contracted away.
This

principle

applies

equally

to

rights

contracted

away

in

negotiations between the parties outside of the Court context, as
well as to those actually submitted to and approved by the Court.
Defendant voluntarily contracted away his property rights by deed
to the plaintiff for valuable consideration and should not have
been allowed by the trial court to use the equity argument to
reclaim the rights which he had freely and voluntarily given up.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE AND THIS COURT HAS THE POWER
TO REVIEW THE FACTS AND ENTER JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF.
It is clearly established law in the State of Utah that this
Court will not disturb the findings of fact in an equity case
unless

the

evidence

court's findings.

clearly

preponderates

against

the

trial

Baker v. Patteef supra; Bown v. Loveland, 678

P.2d 292 (Utah 1984); Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495
15

P.2d 811 (1972); First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Hall, 29
Utah 2d 24, 504 P.2d 995 (1972).
stand

for the

proposition

that

The cited cases also clearly
the

Court

may,

upon

request,

conduct a new and independent review of both questions of law and
questions of fact and may substitute its judgment for the trial
court where the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial
court's decision.
The

evidence

in

the

present

case

against the trial courtfs findings.

clearly

preponderates

Defendant's position most

strongly stated in his direct testimony is that plaintiff told
him if he deeded the property to her parents that her parents
would then make a gift to the parties by borrowing money against
the property to pay the marital debts of the parties and that the
parents would then reconvey the property to the plaintiff and
defendant.

(R. 169-171).

On cross examination defendant admitted the following:
Q

(By Mr.

Lambert)

Mr.

DeWegeli,

that

is

your

signature on that deed, isn't it?
A

Yes, it is.

Q

You don't claim that you were incompetent at the

time you signed that deed, do you?
A

No.

16

Q

And nobody coerced you or tried to force you to

sign that deed, did they?
A

No.

Q

You went

down

and

signed

the deed

at

Security

Title and Abstract Company, it that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Who was with you when you did that?

A

Just my wife.

Q

And then you then asked —

or the both of you

asked Security Title to record the deed, is that true?
A

Yes.

Q

And as indicated on the deed, it was recorded, is

that your understanding?
A

Yes.

Q

Now you during this —

certainly after this deed

was executed you did leave the home, didn't you?
A

Yes.

I

went

down

to

St.

George,

Utah.

(R. 177-178).
•

*

*

Q

Prior to your signing this deed, that is Exhibit

No.

1,

did

you

have

any

mother-in-law?
A

As to what?

17

conversations

with

your

Q

Concerning the deed?

A

No, not to my recollection.

Plaintiff

respectfully

submits

(R. 180-181).
that

the

above

facts

as

presented at trial cannot, as a matter of law, establish fraud,
constructive trust, invalid delivery, failure of consideration or
any other recognized

theory upon which to void

the transfer.

Defendant's failure to even discuss the giving of the deed with
plaintiff's parents precludes any right to rely on their purported
willingness

to simply

give back his

interest

in the property

the Court

to examine the

after paying his debts.
Plaintiff

respectfully

requests

facts as set forth in the record and this brief which clearly
indicate that defendant forwarded no legal theory upon which he
should avoid the contractual arrangement he made with plaintiff.
Absent such evidence, the court's findings and order are clearly
erroneous and must be reversed with judgment to be entered in
favor of plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff does not merely rely upon the status of title to
defeat defendant's interest, but relies upon the clear evidence
that defendant freely and voluntarily contracted away his rights
to the property in question and cannot now enter a plea that the
trial court has inherent equitable powers to reclaim his rights
18

and privileges to the property.
not justify

The evidence before the Court

simply

does

cancelling

should

reverse and enter judgment

the deed

and this

Court

in favor of the plaintiff

awarding her all right, title and interest to the real property
J^

in question.

DATED this

*?(

„

day of

IHMI

1986.

V< DAVrtf LAMBERT,/for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

~> (

day of

'1-

1986, four true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellatefs
Brief were mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to the following:
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Respondent
290 West Center
Provo, Utah 84601

D.DAVXD LAMBERT'
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ADDENDUM

JAN 2 ? AM o kh

D. DAVID LAMBERT, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345

Our File No. T6,602

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CAROLE LEE DeWEGELI,
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 69,539

HARRISON G. DeWEGELI,
Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial on the
9th day of September, 1985.
Lambert.

Plaintiff

was present with her counsel, D. David

The defendant was present with his counsel, Brian C. Harrison.

The Court

received testimony and evidence from each of the parties and after consideration
thereof and after considerations of the pleadings on file, and having

heretofore

entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff

is awarded a decree of divorce, divorcing her from

the

defendant, which shall be final and absolute upon filing and entry in the office of
the Utah County Clerk.
2.

Plaintiff

is awarded the care, custody and control of the parties'

minor child, Cindy DeWegeli, subject to reasonable rights of visitation for the
defendant.

3.

Plaintiff is restored her maiden name of Carole Lee Hoffman.

4.

The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff for the support and

maintenance of the minor child the sum of $200 per month beginning with September,
1985, and continuing until the child reaches her age of majority.
ordered,

as

additional

child

support,

to

provide

health,

The defendant is

accident

and

dental

insurance for the minor child and pay for medical or dental expenses not covered by
such insurance.
5.

The deed from plaintiff

and defendant

to plaintiff's parents was

intended as a security interest for obligations owing to plaintiff's parents.
deed from plaintiff's

parents to plaintiff

conveying

The

the home located at 3301

Mohican Lane, Provo, Utah, Utah County, Utah, did not alter defendant's interest in
the home and the home of the parties is a marital asset, subject to all existing
liens and encumbrances.
had he so requested.

Plaintiff's parents would have given a deed to defendant
The conveyance to only the plaintiff,

therefore, was not

intended to terminate defendant's interest in the property.
6.

Plaintiff's parents, Lorna Hoffman and Alvin John Hoffman, are not

parties to this action and the Court makes no determination as to the validity of a
third trust deed on the home of the parties given to the Hoffmans by the plaintiff,
nor does the Court make any determination as to the Hoffman's interest in the
property in question.
Upon a subsequent determination in an appropriate action, if it is determined
that the trust deed given to the plaintiff's parents by plaintiff is not a valid

2

encumbrance, then in that event it would not be a lien upon the marital assets of
the parties.
7.

Plaintiff is awarded the home located at 3301 Mohican Lane, Provo,

Utah, until she remarries, the youngest child reaches 18 years of age, plaintiff
vacates the home or plaintiff sells the home, whichever occurs first.

AT the time

of such event (unless previously sold), the home is to be sold and the equity in
the home should be divided equally between the parties after deducting all costs of
sale.

The equity is to be determined based upon the value of the home as of May,

1984, or the time of sale, whichever is the lesser amount.
8.

Plaintiff should be awarded the business known as Ledo Art Gallery,

also known as University Art Center, as her sole and separate property.
9.

Each party is awarded those items of personal property which are

presently in their possession.
10.

Each party is ordered to pay one-half of the marital debts and

obligations, with the exception of the debts relating to the home and the business,
which are to be paid by the plaintiff,

and except for the medical and dental

obligations which are to be paid in whole by the defendant.
11.

Neither party is entitled to any award of alimony or support from the

other party.
12.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the defendant in the sum of

$1,000 as attorney fees against the defendant.
13.

Plaintiff is entitled to an order to withhold and deliver from the

3

defendant's income in accordance with the provisions of § 78-45d-2, et sea., Utah
Code Annotated, 1952 as amended in 1985.
DATED thisX-/ day of January, 1986.
BY TH

tOfjfa*'

RA
DIS
APPROVED AS TO FORM

F--

BRIAN C. HARRISON
Attorney for Defendant
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HARDTNG
LICT COURT JUDGE

D. DAVID LAMBERT, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
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tSur.File No. 16,602

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CAROLE LEE DeWEGELI,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 69,539

HARRISON G. DeWEGELI,
Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial on the
9th day of September, 1985.
Lambert.

Plaintiff

was present with her counsel, D. David

The defendant was present with his counsel, Brian C. Harrison.

The Court

received testimony and evidence from each of the parties and after consideration
thereof and after considerations of the pleadings on file, the Court hereby makes
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.
Utah, and

Both plaintiff and defendant are residents of Utah County, State of
have

been

fore

more than

three

months immediately

prior

to the

commencement of this action for divorce.
2.

Plaintiff and defendant were married on the 20th day of December,

1960 and since that date have been and now are husband and wife.

3.

There is one minor child of this marriage whose full name and date

of birth are: Cindy DeWegeli, June 3, 1969.
4.

Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody

and control of the parties' minor child, subject to reasonable rights of visitation
for the defendant.
5.

Defendant, by his repeated course of conduct, is verbally abusing

the plaintiff and by his abandonment of the plaintiff and the minor child, has
treated the plaintiff cruelly, causing her great mental distress and suffering and
entitling her to a decree of divorce.
6.

Plaintiff is entitled to be restored her maiden name of Carole Lee

Hoffman.
7.

The defendant

should pay

to the plaintiff

for

the support

and

maintenance of the minor child the sum of $200 per month beginning with September,
1985, and continuing until the child reaches her age of majority.

The defendant

should, as additional child support, provide health, accident and dental insurance
for the minor child and pay for the medical or dental expenses not covered by such
insurance.
8.

The deed from plaintiff

and defendant to plaintiff's

parents was

intended as a security interest for obligations owing to plaintiff's parents.
deed from plaintiff's

parents to plaintiff

The

conveying the home located at 3301

Mohican, Provo, Utah County, Utah, did not alter defendant's interest in the home
and the home of the parties is found to be a marital asset, subject to all existing
liens and encumbrances.
2

9.

Plaintiff's parents, Lorna Hoffman and Alvin John Hoffman, are not

parties to this action and the Court makes no determination as to the validity of a
third trust deed on the home of the parties given to the Hoffmans by the plaintiff,
nor does the Court make any determination as to the Hoffman's interest in the
property in question.
10.

Plaintiff should be awarded the home located at 3301 Mohican Lane,

Provo, Utah, until she remarries, the youngest child reaches

18 years of

age,

plaintiff vacates the home or plaintiff sells the home, whichever occurs first.

At

the time of such event (unless previously sold), the home is to be sold and the
equity in the home should be divided equally between the parties after deducting
all costs of sale.

The equity is to be determined based upon the value of the home

as of May, 1984, or the time of sale, whichever is the lesser amount.
11.

Plaintiff should be awarded the business known as Ledo Art Gallery,

also known as University Art Center, as her sole and separate property.
12.

Each party should be awarded those items of personal property which

are presently in their possession.
13.

Each party should be ordered to pay on-half of the marital debts and

obligations, with the exception of the debts relating to the home and the business,
which are to be paid by the plaintiff, and except for the medical and dental
obligations which should be paid in whole by the defendant.
14.

Neither party is entitled to any award of alimony or support from the

other party.

3

15.

Plaintiff should be awarded judgment against defendant in the sum of

$1,000 as attorney fees against the defendant.
16.

Plaintiff

is entitled to an order to withhold and deliver from the

defendant's income in accordance with the provisions of § 78-45d-2, et sea.. Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended in 1985.
From the foregoing Findings of Facts, the Court now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce

on the grounds of mental cruelty and that such Decree shall become final upon entry
in the records of the Clerk of the Court.
2.

The plaintiff is entitled to be awarded the care, custody and control

of the minor child of the parties, subject to reasonable rights of visitation to the
defendant.
3.

The parties are entitled to orders entered concerning the issues of

real property, personal

property, debts and obligations,

child support,

alimony,

insurance, and attorney's fees as more fully set forth in the foregoing Findings of

DATED this/C/ day of January, 1986.
BY>TH]

RA
DIST
4

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

d-

BRIAN C. HARRISON
Attorney for Defendant
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WARRANTY DEED
HARRISON G. DEWEGELI

and CAROLE L. D E W E G E L I , u i s wife
P r o v o , Utah

Grantor...., of..

hereby CONVEY.... A N D W A R R A N T . . . . t/% ALVIN J. HOFFMAN and LORNA M . H O F F M A N ,
husband and w i f e , as joint tenants w i t h full rights of survivorship

Grantee

s

of _

17100 Holiday D r i v e ,
iXrmt Addrvw

for the sum of.

Calif.

Morgan Hill

City

95037

County

$10.00 and other valuable consideration - - -

..DOLLARS

Utah

the following described tract of land in....

County,

State of Utah, to-wit:
Lot 1 8 , Block 1 0 , Plat "A", INDIAN HILLS SUBDIVISION, P r o v o , U t a h ,
according to the official plat thereof on file in the office of the
Recorder, Utah County, Utah.
Subject to r e s t r i c t i o n s , e a s e m e n t s , covenants and right of ways of record,
visible by inspection or o t h e r w i s e .

WITNESS THE HAND..?, of said Grantor?... this
March

%A

D

19

.?P.H}._

_

day of

84

Signed in the nresence of

.Ham'son
C\ TJew
Harrison G\
Dewegeli
Carole L. Dewegeli

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

££?*?.

On the

?2S!

March

day ol..

, A. D. 19..?A..., personally appeared

before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, .
Carole L. Dewegeli, h i s wife

Harrison G. Dewegeli and

me that .. the.X-^eocecuted the same.

the signer .§. ol the above instrument, who duly acknowl

U^CJ^2^.
Notary Public
My cdjtomission: expires

Residing at.

.Provo, Utah

C

V'"ML~» 'i»t

MAIL TAX NOTICE TO
Grantees

V

2
Courwtv of SECURITY T I T L E & A B S T R A C

. 55 I f t t c i ^ t m p < r £ £ > , Utah 84601

en

I

l* 12

»

15436
WARRANTY DEED
Grantor....,^

Morjgn.jmj;*^^^

hereby CONVEY.... AND WARRANT.... to

CAROLJJL^.DEWEGELI..

Grantee...., o £ . . 3 ^ J ^ . ^ i ? f . ? . . t a . ? S

Utah

Utah

.?H£ v f..

StrMt Addr*u

City

..DOLLARS

for the sum o f . . J J i S ^ . Q 9 . J ^ - . 9 j y ? . S ^
a

the following described tract of land in

County,

.

State of Utah, to-wit:

Lot 1 8 , B l o c k 1 0 , P l a t "A", I n d i a n H i l l s S u b d i v i s i o n , P r o v o , U t a h ,
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e o f f i c i a l p l a t t h e r e o f on f i l e i n t h e o f f i c e o f t h e
R e c o r d e r , Utah C o u n t y , U t a h .
S u b j e c t t o r e s t r i c t i o n s , e a s e m e n t s , c o v e n a n t s and r i g h t o f ways o f
r e c o r d v i s i b l e by i n s p e c t i o n o r o t h e r w i s e .

(110)
-z-

i

,OOb

WITNESS THE HAND..S. of said Grantor...? this

l l t h

- . , A. D. 19. 84

Jfcy

Signed in the presence of

STATE OF UTAH,
County of ...UTAH
On the

li.^.

day of

£?.X

, A. D. 19....M., personally appeared

before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,

Alvin
J. Hoffman and Lorna M.
.

Hoffman, his wife
the signer..?. of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged
to me
me tnat
that ..-ne....
.:-he~Y. executed
executed the
the same.
same.
:kn owl edged to

'< ,
jy
•' Q J I y» ccanfaiissiori expires

.

.67.18/198.6.

Notary Public

Residing at-.-Prjoizo., U t a h ,

"=3—
MAIL TAX NOTICE TO

Courtwv of SECURITY T I T L E & ABSTRACT CO.. 55 £ • « C«nt«r, Provo. Utah 84601

X

' # mf •* I

without notice to Borrower, be acccleratiwi and became immediately due and payaMe;ft>}agrees to pay to Holder all lawful collection
costs and legal expenses, including: reasonable attorney's fees; and (c) agrees that any payments from whatever source shall first he
applied to Holders collection costs and legal expenses and then to interest and principal as aforesaid. Waiver of any default shall oot^

^Hdtlg^^^^

:&k**S&$^

